The Turkey-Saudi commercial relationship has undergone one of the most dramatic reversals in recent regional history. After nearly five years of political tension that froze bilateral trade and blocked Turkish companies from Saudi procurement, the 2023 diplomatic reset has been followed by a commercial acceleration that has surprised even the most optimistic observers.
The headline trade numbers understate the direction of travel. Bilateral trade has grown from roughly USD 3 billion at the 2021 low to a target of USD 14 billion by 2028 — a target the bilateral chambers now privately expect to exceed. The growth is concentrated in four sectors. Construction is the first: Turkish contracting giants (ENKA, TAV, Limak, YDA) are re-entering Saudi gigaproject procurement aggressively, winning significant scopes in NEOM, Diriyah, and the Red Sea programmes. Defence is the second: Turkish defence primes (Baykar with the Bayraktar TB2, Aselsan with electronic warfare platforms) have structured joint ventures with the Saudi Military Industries Corporation that are reshaping local defence manufacturing. Hospitality and tourism infrastructure is the third: Turkish hotel operators, resort developers, and leisure retail brands are expanding into Saudi tourism zones. Consumer and retail is the fourth: Turkish family conglomerates in food manufacturing, personal care, and specialty retail are entering the Saudi market systematically.
What makes the Turkey corridor distinctive is the role of the Turkish family holding structure. Unlike the more fragmented Italian SME universe or the state-owned Chinese enterprises, Turkey's largest commercial actors are concentrated in a relatively small number of powerful family holdings — Koç, Sabancı, Zorlu, Doğuş, Eczacıbaşı — each with diversified portfolios and the institutional capability to execute Saudi entry at scale. These holdings are now opening permanent Riyadh offices, appointing Saudi-focused investment committees, and running dedicated Saudi strategy teams.
The cultural bridge runs deeper than commercial opportunity. Istanbul has become a popular Saudi leisure and medical tourism destination, with weekly flight frequency from Riyadh and Jeddah tripling over the past two years. Saudi royal and commercial families maintain extensive Istanbul residential and commercial holdings. The Turkish diaspora in the Gulf is large, professionalised, and increasingly central to the commercial intermediation between the two markets.
For Turkish companies, the practical question is not whether to enter Saudi Arabia. It is how to structure entry to capture the second-wave opportunities — tier-two gigaprojects, specialist manufacturing, and post-construction operations — without getting trapped in the commoditised contracting tiers that are now highly competitive. IDR's Turkey corridor work is concentrated on this structuring question: qualifying which Turkish capabilities fit which Saudi opportunities, structuring local partnerships with Saudi family holdings that provide durable market access, and navigating the regulatory environment that remains materially different from Turkey's domestic operating context.
